Contests with multiple alternative prizes: Public-good/bad prizes and externalities

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020

Kyung Hwan Baik, Hanjoon Michael Jung

Abstract

We study contests in which there are multiple alternative public-good/bad prizes, and the players compete, by expending irreversible effort, over which prize to have awarded to them. Each prize may be a public good for some players and a public bad for the others, and the players expend their effort simultaneously and independently. We first prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game, then establish when the total effort level expended for each prize is unique across the Nash equilibria, and then summarize and highlight other interesting and important properties of the equilibria. Finally, we discuss the effects of heterogeneity of valuations on the players’ equilibrium effort levels and a possible extension of the model.

Keywords

Contest, Externalities, Public-good/bad prizes, Free riding, Existence of equilibrium, Uniqueness of the equilibrium effort levels

作者

Kyung Hwan Baik,韩国成均馆大学经济系教授。Hanjoon Jung，美国宾夕法尼亚州立大学经济学博士,马寅初经济学院副教授。主要研究方向为微观经济学理论、博弈论、产业组织和新政治经济学,发表的文章被诺贝尔经济学奖得主Roger Myerson教授多次引用。

文章全文参见链接：

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.06.004