时间：2019-06-11
马寅初经济学院副教授Hanjoon Jung博士应邀参加了于2019年6月8-9日在北京举行的2019 Beijing International Workshop on Microeconomics: Empirics, Experiments and Theory研讨会，并在会议上报告了他和清华大学经济管理学院副教授郑捷和香港中文大学商学院助理教授连暐虹合作的论文“两方参与的公共品全支付拍卖竞赛”。大会主旨发言嘉宾、Contest领域的权威学者Dan Kovenock教授对他们的工作给予了正面评价。
Hanjoon Jung副教授报告论文的中英文摘要如下：
两方参与的公共品全支付拍卖竞赛
我们研究了一个两方参与的全支付拍卖竞赛问题。在该拍卖竞赛中，决策者会从多种公共品中选择一种作为奖励，而两位参与者则需要通过初始沉没成本的投入与依赖于具体奖励类型的追加投入来进行竞争。需要指出的是，每一种奖励对参与者而言，既可能具有正外部性，也可能具有负外部性。本文博弈模型中，两位参与者独立且同时做出投资决策。在该设定下，我们证明了纳什均衡的存在，同时也得到了均衡唯一解存在的条件。我们的工作沿用Siegel (Econometrica，2009)的竞赛框架，将私有品属性的奖励拓展为具有外部性的公共品奖励；我们也将Klose and Kovenock (Economic Theory，2015）的拍卖设定与个体依赖的外部性设定分别拓展为更一般化的竞赛设定与个体投入依赖的外部性设定。我们的工作有效结合了竞赛文献与公共品提供文献，填补了如何以竞赛方式确定公共品提供的理论空白。
Public-good All-pay Contests with Two Players
We study all-pay contests with two players in which there are multiple public-good prizes, only one of which will be selected, and the players compete, by making both sunk and conditional investment, over which prize to have awarded by a decision maker. Specifically, each prize may be a public good or even a public bad for players. We set up a game in which the players make their investment simultaneously and independently, and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the game. We also provide the uniqueness condition of an equilibrium. Our work combines the contest literature and the public good provision literature, by extending Siegel (Econometrica，2009)'s contest framework to prizes with externality features, and by generalizing Klose and Kovenock (Economic Theory，2015) 's auction setup with identity-dependent externalities to richer contest environment with identity-and-effort-dependent externalities.
