International Journal of Economic Theory┃Asymmetric contests with initial probabilities of winning

Asymmetric contests with initial probabilities of winning

International Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 15, pp. 385-398, December 2019

Kyung Hwan Baik, Hanjoon Michael Jung

Abstract

We study contests in which each player has an initial probability of winning the prize. First, we consider a model in which the impact parameter is exogenous. We find that neither the number of active players nor their identities nor the effort levels depend on the initial probabilities of winning. We find also that the possibility that the winner is determined by the initial probabilities of winning reduces prize dissipation, and tends to make most players better off, compared to the contest without this possibility. Then, considering a model in which the impact parameter is endogenous, we find that every player may expend zero effort.

文章全文参见链接：

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ijet.12173