【题目】Structural Manipulation in a Multi-period Sender-receiver Game
【主讲人】Hanjoon Michael Jung 台湾中央研究院经济研究所助理研究员
Hanjoon Michael Jung received his Ph.D in economicsfrom Department of Economics at the Pennsylvania State University. Heisan assistant research fellowatthe Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica in Taiwan.His primary fields ofresearch and teachingaremicroeconomictheory,gametheory, andindustrialorganization. His secondary field ispoliticaleconomy.His nine SSCI/EconLit publications appear in Journal of Mathematical Economics, Economics Letters, etc.
This paper shows how an informed politician can manipulate uninformed, yet rational, citizens in a multi-period sender-receiver game. By examining the payoff structure, the citizens find out that the politician has an incentive to be honest. Hence, they never doubt him and make their decision according to his messages. However, the information structure restricts the citizens’ ability to detect his misleading them, and so they cannot punish him properly. Therefore, under this game structure, the politician can mislead them without having significant disadvantages, and hence will manipulate their decision in his favor.